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Abstract
Affective agnosia, an impairment in knowing how one feels emotionally, has been described as an extreme deficit
in the experience and expression of emotion that may confer heightened risk for adverse medical outcomes.
Alexithymia, by contrast, has been proposed as an over-arching construct that includes a spectrum of deficits of
varying severity, including affective agnosia at the more severe end. This perspective has been challenged by Taylor
and colleagues, who argue that the concept of affective agnosia is unnecessary. We compare these two
perspectives by highlighting areas of agreement, reasons for asserting the importance of the affective agnosia
concept, errors in Taylor and colleagues’ critique, and measurement issues. The need for performance-based
measures of the ability to mentally represent emotional states in addition to metacognitive measures is
emphasized. We then draw on a previously proposed three-process model of emotional awareness that
distinguishes affective response generation, conceptualization and cognitive control processes which interact to
produce a variety of emotional awareness and alexithymia phenotypes - including affective agnosia. The tools for
measuring these three processes, their neural substrates, the mechanisms of brain-body interactions that confer
heightened risk for adverse medical outcomes, and the differential treatment implications for different kinds of
deficits are described. By conceptualizing alexithymia as a spectrum of deficits, the opportunity to match specific
deficit mechanisms with personalized treatment for patients will be enhanced.
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Introduction
The concept of alexithymia has been an important advance
in our understanding of how dysregulated emotions may
adversely affect physical health. The term “alexithymia”
was coined by Sifneos [1] with the intention of describing
a deficit in the ability to identify and describe emotions
that included a limitation in the ability to put emotions
into words. Although there were forerunners of this con-
cept in Ruesch’s [2] “infantile personality,” Alexander’s [3]
“visceral neurosis,” and Marty and d’Muzan’s [4] “pensée
opératoire,” all of which involved limitations or impair-
ments in the ability to symbolically represent emotions,
the concept of alexithymia has come to dominate the field.
Much credit for this goes not only to Sifneos and Nemiah
for their clinical descriptions and early research but also to
Graeme Taylor and his colleagues for creating what is now
the leading measure of alexithymia, called the Twenty-
Item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) [5, 6]. In fact, in
a recent paper attempting to expand upon the concept of
alexithymia (which we will refer to as the “source” docu-
ment), we described a variant of alexithymia called
“affective agnosia” [7]. In a surprising turn, Taylor and his
colleagues [8] stated (in what we will refer to as the
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“rebuttal” document) that our contribution did not ad-
vance the theory, measurement or treatment of alexithy-
mia, and that the phenomenon in question had already
been described. The purpose of the present paper is to cor-
rect certain potentially misleading statements in the rebut-
tal document, reaffirm our view that affective agnosia is a
useful and novel concept, and explain in greater detail why
we believe that to be the case. This explanation requires
detailed consideration of the various points made by Tay-
lor and colleagues. After addressing these points we will
present our view of the way forward in alexithymia
research.
Points of agreement with Taylor and colleagues
It is not surprising that many points of agreement (both
explicit and implicit) exist in the source and rebuttal
documents. Each of them reflects contributions to the
alexithymia literature over several decades.
1. There is consensus that alexithymia is an important
clinical construct worthy of serious attention, both
in terms of theory and measurement.
2. The key point that inspired the concept of affective
agnosia is agreed: individuals with alexithymia may
have deficits in their ability to mentally represent
emotions. If someone has such a deficit, then it
naturally follows that they will not be able to
describe emotional experiences in words. This is
consistent with Freud’s [9] original formulation of
agnosia. In their rebuttal, Taylor and colleagues
provided an impressively erudite review of the
psychoanalytic literature on the conceptualization
of alexithymia including numerous mentions of
mental representation deficits. We appreciate this
literature review because it supports the
neuroscience-based claim we were making, and
provides the relevant hypothesis-generating clinical
background in this area. Although we did
acknowledge that the alexithymia literature includes
mention of deficits in the mental representation of
emotions, many relevant references were not
included. We thank Taylor and colleagues for filling
this gap.
3. The concept of alexithymia arose while considering
how emotion and its dysregulation could contribute
to physical disease [10, 11]. We agree that the
possible linkage between alexithymia and medical
disorders is important for the field and that it is
important to understand the mechanisms of this
association.
4. Alexithymia is difficult to treat clinically [12];
advances in our ability to treat it would be very
welcome.
5. Taylor and colleagues said that pensée opératoire
(“operational thinking”) is an essential component
of alexithymia and that the concept of affective
agnosia does not explicitly include it. We agree that
affective agnosia does not explicitly include the
concept of pensée opératoire, and we will discuss
this and its implications further below.
Reasons for affirming the existence of affective agnosia
We note that many important points about the con-
struct of affective agnosia in the source document were
not contested in the rebuttal document. These include:
1. It is important to be able to identify people with
severe alexithymia. The original descriptions of
alexithymia by Sifneos and Nemiah involved people
who not only lacked words for feelings but
appeared to have “a diminution or absence of the
basic human ability to experience feelings”
(emphasis added) [10]. One point of disagreement
has to do with whether the current leading measure
of alexithymia, the TAS-20, is capable of
consistently capturing this severe kind of deficit.
2. Affective agnosia makes neurocognitive sense. It
refers to a deficit in the conceptualization of
affective somatic/interoceptive sensations (in
consideration of context) and thus an impairment
in recognition. As such, we use the term in a
somatic/interoceptive context in a manner that is
directly parallel to the traditional use of the concept
of agnosia in relation to exteroceptive sensory
information, such as impairments in the ability to
recognize (as opposed to simply perceive) the
sensory qualities of faces, written text, sounds,
colors, etc.
3. There is a plausible neuroanatomical basis for
affective agnosia. Rather than being defined in
purely psychological terms, we ground the
construct in specified neural structures and
circuitry.
4. The term agnosia has an established nosological
meaning. This can be useful when communicating
with medical colleagues in sister disciplines, or
trainees who do not have previous experience with
the concept of alexithymia or the supporting
literature. Colleagues who are more familiar with
existing nosological conventions may well take the
term “alexithymia” to mean ‘inability to read words
pertaining to mood,’ since alexia conventionally
denotes a reading disorder.
5. To understand the relation between emotion
processing (and its impairments) and physical
disease it is useful if not essential to have a
biological model that explains the mechanisms. If
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investigators interested in psychological and social
factors that influence the course and progression of
physical diseases wish to communicate with
physicians and other health professionals within a
conceptual framework that those individuals can
understand and appreciate, it is very useful to
translate psychological constructs into brain-based
terms that can then explain how mind/brain
phenomena result in peripheral physiological
changes that influence pathophysiology [13].
Without such a translation, the explanation for how
such psychological factors influence physical
diseases cannot be cast in mechanistic terms. In this
context, an excellent summary of the neural
correlates of alexithymia has recently been
published by Goërlich and Aleman [14]. This review
of structural and functional imaging studies
addressed the cognitive and emotional features of
alexithymia, including emotional attention,
experience, awareness, learning and imagery. It did
not, however, directly address the mechanisms by
which the brain of alexithymic individuals
communicates with peripheral physiological systems
to heighten risk for adverse physical disease
outcomes. Moreover, this review did not highlight
the distinction between the mental representation
of emotional states (by the default mode network in
our model) and the linguistic expression of emotion
in language areas, a critical distinction
corresponding to the distinction between agnosia
and anomia. Importantly, our neural model of
affective agnosia integrates mental representation of
emotion with disease-related peripheral
physiological processes, both of which involve the
participation of the medial prefrontal cortex [7].
The fact that the neuroanatomical basis of affective
agnosia is specified makes mechanistic research
possible and associated hypotheses falsifiable.
6. Performance measures and self-report measures do
not measure the same thing, and correlations
between them are often low. According to Dunning
and colleagues [15], in the realm of complex social
skills correlations between self-report and objective
measures range from 0.04 to 0.17. This is highly
relevant to the current discussion, as a leading
measure of affective agnosia, the Levels of
Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS) [16], is a
performance measure; in contrast, the leading
measure of the parent concept of alexithymia is the
TAS-20, a self-report measure [5, 6]. The
correlation between these two measures is quite
low (r = − 0.12 based on a meta-analysis of 21
studies [17]), consistent with the observations of
Dunning and colleagues [15]. This low correlation
is likely due at least in part to differences in
measurement method. However, there are also rea-
sons to believe the TAS-20 and LEAS do not meas-
ure the same underlying phenomenon, which is also
a problem not unique to alexithymia where there
are multiple measures aiming to assess the same
construct. On its face, the LEAS measures the ex-
tent and sophistication of emotion concept use
within cognition (i.e. what types of concepts –
expressed in words – individuals spontaneously use
to understand the bodily sensations and behaviors
of self and others in social/emotional situations). In
contrast, the TAS-20 asks individuals to self-report
their explicit beliefs about their ability to understand
emotions and bodily sensations and their
preferences for certain kinds of cognitive and
emotional experiences. Thus, there is a clear
content difference. Further, it is also well-known
that self-reported beliefs often mismatch with
objective behavioral performance in other
socio-emotional domains (e.g. one can believe they
have a strong ability to recognize emotions and yet
perform poorly on emotion recognition tasks, or
the reverse). It is unsurprising, therefore, that
performance on the LEAS and TAS-20 scores can
diverge. Importantly, these two individual
differences could have quite different impacts on
physiological and behavioral responding. For
example, explicit beliefs about one’s emotional
capacities could plausibly influence the situations an
individual chooses to enter (e.g., anticipatory
anxiety and avoidance of social situations due to the
belief that one will not fare well socially), whereas
actual emotional capacities could more strongly
influence direct social interactions (e.g., being aware
of the emotions of self and others in the moment
and using this information to guide physiological
and behavioral responding). Following on the
previous point, it is important to distinguish
between a true deficit and a perceived (meta-
cognitive belief or judgment of) deficit as described
in self-report inventories. This distinction maps
onto the performance vs. self-report nature of the
LEAS and TAS-20, respectively. It helps to explain
why Taylor and colleagues also created the
clinician-rated Toronto Structured Interview for
Alexithymia (TSIA) [18], which consists of a
clinician’s evaluation of the degree to which
alexithymia is present. This, in our view, is the
leading measure for objectively demonstrating that
alexithymia is present.
7. Deficits in the ability to acquire, represent, and
subsequently use emotion concepts within deliberative
cognition, which are central to the construct of affective
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agnosia, provide foci for therapeutic intervention in
treating alexithymia, which is notoriously difficult to do.
Errors, misstatements and misunderstandings
Before discussing areas of disagreement, and our reasons
for disagreeing, we believe it is important to set the rec-
ord straight regarding certain errors, misstatements and
misunderstandings in the rebuttal.
1. Taylor and colleagues state that Freud’s concept of
“primal repression” involved a lack of mental
representation that captured the phenomenon of
affective agnosia equally well, thus rendering the
latter concept unnecessary. This claim overlooks an
important aspect of what Freud [19] intended by
his concept of “primal repression.” First and
foremost, he conceptualized it as an innate process,
present at the origin of every normal human mind:
certain impulses were never crystalized as thinkable
representations because to think such things would
overwhelm the nascent ego. This instinctual core of
the repressed is to be distinguished from
“repression proper” which refers to mental contents
that had been consciously represented at one point
and then were relegated to the unconscious because
of their distressing content. Second, in Freud’s
scheme what is repressed and not consciously
represented is a thought that would trigger an
emotion, not a representation of emotion per se.
This contrasts significantly with our notion of
affective agnosia as a deficit in the cognitive
representation of affective states, under a
conception of emotion that is independent of
dynamic defensive processes. Moreover, it is critical
to emphasize that the concept of alexithymia itself
refers to a deficit; it is not a defense-based concept,
although defensive processes could conceivably be
activated as a result of this deficit (and some
defenses could also hinder learning and lead to
deficit). It would seriously undermine the concept
of alexithymia to assert that the extreme expression
of it on a dimensional continuum reflects any kind
of defensive process. Given the premier insight of
Nemiah and Sifneos [10], namely that they were
observing a deficit in their patients and not a
defense, Freud’s concept of primal repression is
antithetical to their concept of alexithymia, and
therefore in our view is untenable as a substitute or
equivalent concept to affective agnosia. We must
conclude that the concept of affective agnosia is not
rendered redundant by the concept of primal
repression, and therefore has potential value.
2. Taylor and colleagues state that we asserted that
the term affective agnosia should replace
alexithymia. A careful reading of the source
document will reveal that this is not true. Perhaps
confusion arose because we asserted that the
extreme form of affective agnosia anchored a
continuum of severity of deficits in the mental
representation of emotion. We also asserted that
there was a need to differentiate between an
agnosic type of alexithymia (a relative inability to
recognize emotions) and an anomic type of
alexithymia (a relative inability to name emotions),
and that the latter would anchor another
continuum of severity. Both types, we proposed,
would be subsumed under the superordinate, well-
established construct of alexithymia. We elaborate
further on this below.
3. Taylor and colleagues state that we did not
acknowledge that heightened negative affect with
alexithymia makes sense in certain contexts. In fact,
we did acknowledge that such an association made
sense when the impairment in affective processing
is in the mild to moderate range. For example, this
association makes sense in the context of
psychiatric disorders where difficulties in
recognizing, understanding, and describing one’s
own negatively valenced affective responses can
contribute to such responses being prolonged and
dysregulated. However, in the context of systemic
medical disorders in which the influence of
reported negative emotions such as depression and
anxiety on medical outcome is well established [20],
it is important to be able to measure impairments
in emotion processing independent of self-reported
negative affect so that the contribution of such
impairments can be quantified. Of course, this issue
can be addressed in part by controlling for negative
affect in studies using the TAS-20. However, given
the distinct phenomena measured by the LEAS and
TAS-20, there are additional reasons to separately
examine affective agnosia with the LEAS, as the
construct measured by this measure does not
appear related to self-reported negative affect (note:
very low LEAS scores could also potentially deter
self-reported negative affect, as such individuals
might tend only to report somatic sensations). We
elaborate on these points further below.
4. Taylor and colleagues state that we did not
distinguish between emotion and feeling. This is
surprising because the distinction is central to our
concept of affective agnosia. Their claim may arise
because of differences in how basic terms in this
area are used. The distinction in question is
captured by our distinction between implicit and
explicit emotional responses. “Implicit” corresponds
to affective (valenced) bodily responses
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(visceromotor and somatomotor responses) that
can be felt as bodily sensations but not understood,
whereas “explicit” corresponds to the
conceptualization of those bodily sensations as
emotions (allowing description in language of
discrete emotions as well as the use of emotion
concept knowledge to adaptively guide further
visceral and behavioral responses). Depending upon
the definition used, our use of the terms “bodily
sensations” (comparable to “emotion” as used by
Taylor and colleagues) and “emotion
conceptualization” (comparable to “feelings” as used
by Taylor and colleagues) can be mapped to the
implicit-explicit distinction, respectively.
5. Taylor and colleagues state that we did not
acknowledge that if agnosia is present then one will
also observe an inability to describe emotional
experience. This association follows naturally from
the concept of agnosia (after all, how can one
adequately describe what one doesn’t recognize?)
and is mentioned in our source document (7) on
page 599 (also see the figure caption on the same
page). However, it is worth highlighting that
individuals with associative visual agnosia can
describe the perceptual qualities of what they see
(e.g., they can draw a picture of the shapes and
colors that they see in an image but not recognize
the objects in the image). In our model, this is
analogous to a preserved ability to describe
valenced bodily sensations, but with a deficit in the
ability to recognize those sensations under an
emotion concept. We also asserted that it was
important to affirm the existence of an anomia
version of alexithymia in which mental
representation of emotional states and thus the
ability to recognize these states is intact – which
would allow an individual to retain the use of
emotion concept knowledge to adaptively guide
behavior despite the naming deficit. Taylor and
colleagues argue instead that alexithymia includes
both agnosia-type and anomia-type phenomena and
that a designation of subtypes is not needed. We
elaborate on this
important distinction below.
6. In their rebuttal, Taylor and colleagues highlighted
findings that were consistent with predictions based
on the alexithymia construct as evidence against
findings we discussed that were counter-intuitive. It
appears that our intent in citing the counter-
intuitive findings was misunderstood. Our intended
point was to convey that the heterogeneity of
findings may be indicative of the problem with
self-reports, which is that they cannot determine
the accuracy of an individual’s beliefs about their
own deficits. For example, since they are minimally
correlated, the same individual may have high
scores on both the TAS-20 and the LEAS –
somewhat paradoxically indicating granular emotion
concept use in behavior along with a self-perceived
deficit in doing so. Moreover, the absence of high
scores on the TAS-20 is not a guarantee that an
impairment does not exist (e.g., a low LEAS score
could still be found with moderate probability).
Thus, when one study demonstrates that psychiatric
patients describe a wider range of (and more
differentiated) emotions during interviews as a
function of higher alexithymia scores
(an unexpected finding), while another study shows
the opposite (expected) finding, the latter does not
necessarily nullify the former; it could instead
indicate the presence of subgroups in which similar
self-reported ratings on the questionnaire mean
different things. This position is consistent with our
view that there is value in distinguishing between
more and less severe manifestations of alexithymia
and that additional measures are needed. It should
be noted that we are not claiming that findings with
the LEAS will always agree with prediction. The
two measures capture different things and the
explanation for unexpected findings may not be the
same.
Measurement issues
Many of the conclusions regarding the differing perspec-
tives described above arise from the findings with the
LEAS, a performance measure, and the TAS-20, a self-
report measure. It is notable that both measures have
strong psychometric properties. The LEAS asks respon-
dents to describe in writing how they and another person
would feel in 20 different emotion-evoking scenarios in-
volving two people. Scoring is based on the number and
differentiation of the words used to describe feelings. The
internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88), inter-rater
reliability (intra-class correlation of 0.96) [21], intra-rater
reliability over 2 years (Pearson correlation of r = .99) and
test-retest reliability at 4 weeks (spearman brown correl-
ation = 0.8) [22] are very good to excellent. Many studies
support the construct validity of the LEAS in healthy volun-
teers, psychiatric disorders and systemic medical conditions
[7]. Moreover, multiple brain imaging studies [23–29] and
psychophysiological evidence [30] also support the validity
of the LEAS as a measure of emotional awareness.
The TAS-20 asks respondents to rate their degree of
agreement on a 5-point scale with 20 statements divided
into three factors (difficulty identifying feelings, difficulty
describing feelings and externally oriented thinking).
The TAS-20 similarly has excellent psychometric prop-
erties in terms of internal consistency, test-retest
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reliability, factorial validity and convergent and discrim-
inant validity in student samples and clinical populations
[31].
A meta-analysis of 21 studies that used the LEAS and
TAS-20 in the same participants reveals a low but statis-
tically significant correlation between them of r = − 0.12
[17]. As noted above, this low correlation is likely attrib-
utable both to differences in methodology (self-report vs.
performance measures) and content (meta-cognitive vs.
direct measures of ability). Cultural factors could also be
playing a role as the correlation between the two mea-
sures in a sample of 344 Japanese university students
was negligible (r = − 0.03, NS) [32]. Although this meta-
analysis did not address the relation between TAS-20
factors and the LEAS, one of the largest studies using
both measures that also stratified for age, sex and socio-
economic status revealed a somewhat stronger correl-
ation with factor 3 (externally-oriented thinking) than
the other factors [33]. As discussed further below, exter-
nally oriented thinking is most plausibly associated with
attentional processes in our more recently expanded
“three-process model” of emotional awareness – which
is the final “gatekeeper” in allowing the use of emotion
concepts in conscious thought. Thus, it appears sensible
that this factor correlates more strongly with the LEAS,
as – even if individuals possessed granular emotion con-
cept knowledge – they would not self-report granular
emotions on the LEAS if they did not attend to internal
(e.g., bodily) sources of information about emotions and
use this information to guide their verbal responses. In-
deed, it was only TAS-20 factor 3 that correlated with
the LEAS in the Japanese student sample [32].
In the remainder of this section we review statements
and positions held by Taylor and colleagues in relation
to measurement with which we disagree. Below we ex-
plain why we disagree and provide evidence in support
of our position.
1. A key claim by Taylor and colleagues is that the
TAS-20 is the best measure of alexithymia and the
LEAS does not measure alexithymia. We take issue
with these claims on two primary grounds. First,
the TAS-20 is a meta-cognitive measure of
alexithymia, in that it assesses the respondent’s
beliefs about the presence or absence of their own
psychological deficits. Although there are significant
advantages to a simple measure of this sort (such as
ease of use and short completion time), which are
not to be discounted, self-assessment is not
equivalent to a direct performance measure of the
ability to put emotions into words, which is central
to the alexithymia construct.
A second reason for disagreeing is based on
findings from the only study to date known to
include the TSIA (which may be taken to be the
leading objective measure of alexithymia), the
TAS-20, and the LEAS in 87 German university
students [33]. Results showed that the TSIA-LEAS
correlation was r = -0.47. By comparison, the
original report on the development of the TSIA
[18] observed TAS-20-TSIA correlations of 0.36 in
a community sample of 136 participants and 0.68 in
a clinical sample of 97 participants. Subsequent
published studies of the TSIA-TAS-20 correlation
range from 0.23 to 0.52 (0.23 [34], 0.34 [35], 0.44
[36], 0.49 [37] and 0.52 [38]). Clearly, many more
studies are needed, especially in clinical populations.
Nevertheless, in light of the greater content
similarity of the TSIA and TAS-20, the evidence
indicates comparability of the two measures relative
to the gold standard of the TSIA rather than
superiority of one over the other. Although the
LEAS was not created to be a measure of
alexithymia per se, it was developed to capture the
developmental line along which impairment would
give rise to alexithymia [39, 40] and as such is
foundational to the alexithymia construct. Of
course, it should be acknowledged that the TSIA is
directly measuring yet another phenomenon: how a
clinician perceives an individual’s ability to
recognize and express emotions, and their observed
preference to attend to and focus thought on
internal sources of emotional information. While
this addresses many of the disadvantages of
self-report measures in tracking the TAS-20 factors,
and could also be more informed by the
spontaneous use of emotion words measured by the
LEAS, this approach might also fail to capture other
relevant internal neuro-cognitive dynamics not
directly observable in externally observable behavior
within the context of a clinic. All three measures
may therefore carry some uniquely valuable
information.
2. Taylor and colleagues assert that the LEAS is not a
measure of alexithymia because it does not
explicitly include pensée opératoire, or externally
oriented thinking (TAS-20 Factor 3). Recent
evidence indicates that Factor 3 reflects a limitation
in the ability to focus one’s attention on one’s own
emotions rather than a general bias toward focusing
attention externally [41]. These findings mean that
if someone is limited in their capacity to attend to
and focus on internal sources of emotional
information, they would more likely be
exteroceptively focused and tend not to
spontaneously use granular emotion terns (as
measured by the LEAS). This might be relevant in
collectivist vs. individualist cultures [42] and
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consistent with the observation in Japanese students
that only Factor 3 (inversely) correlated reliably
with the LEAS [32]. One may conclude from this
that the LEAS measures the output produced by
participants who (to variable degrees) attend to
their feelings, conceptualize/identify them, and then
describe them, thus constituting a performance
measure of the end product of the interactions
between factors 3, 1, and 2 of the TAS-20,
respectively, that ultimately determine an
individual’s tendency to exhibit conscious awareness
of their emotions. As such, the LEAS is arguably
measuring performance that depends on the three
skills that the TAS-20 aims to measure (beliefs
about) through self-assessment.
3. Taylor and colleagues assert that the TAS-20 is a
comprehensive measure of the alexithymia
continuum, it covers the extremes quite adequately,
and thus an independent objective measure of a
severe deficit is not needed. Moreover, they assert
that Factor 1 (difficulty identifying feelings) is an
adequate measure of the affective agnosia
phenomenon. In their rebuttal, they offered no
evidence that TAS-20 Total or Factor 1 can capture
severe alexithymia defined by independent objective
criteria. Notably, we recently reported on a case of
severe alexithymia [43] in which the TAS-20 score
was very high (and the LEAS score was very low);
yet, the patient involved was highly aware of her
deficit, which seems to be a requirement for
accurate self-ratings on the TAS-20. Since the
TAS-20 is a meta-cognitive measure and the LEAS
is a performance measure, it would seem potentially
useful to have both types of measures available
given the low correlation between the two (i.e.,
especially in cases of low awareness of deficit in the
presence of severe deficit, which could result in
both low TAS-20 scores and low LEAS scores).
Taylor and colleagues argued that our study using
“theory of mind” measures in relation to the
TAS-20 and LEAS in patients with somatoform
disorders, conversion disorders, and medical
disorders with somatic symptoms [44] was not
relevant to the current discussion because cognitive
theory of mind measures are independent of theory
of mind related to emotional states. First, this is a
debatable point. For example, large-scale neural
networks associated with conceptualization and
internal simulation processes, such as the default
network, appear to do so in a domain-general
manner [45] – which would suggest at least
partially overlapping mechanisms contributing to
mental representation of emotional states,
self-related cognition, and cognitive theory of mind.
Further, current distinctions in the literature
between “affective” and “cognitive” theory of mind
for emotions (roughly corresponding to empathic
sharing of another’s emotions vs. being aware of
their emotions, respectively) have conceptually
distinct relations to emotional awareness – with the
latter being more directly linked to the ability to
report awareness of others’ emotions [44].
We would also highlight that the “Reading the
Mind in the Eyes Test” [46] included in that study
involves the ability to accurately identify affective
states from photos restricted to the eyes. In that
study, the LEAS correlated positively and
significantly with the Eyes Test, even after
controlling for self-reported positive and negative
affect on the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS) measure [47]. By contrast, while the
zero-order correlation of the TAS-20 with the Eyes
Test was significant, this significant correlation
disappeared when controlling for positive and
negative affect. Controlling for self-reported affect is
a way to isolate variance due to difficulty in
identifying and describing emotional states. These
findings support the conclusion that the LEAS is of
value in measuring impairment in the ability to
mentalize emotional states and suggests that the
TAS-20 alone may not be sufficient.
Taylor and colleagues argue that because
alexithymia is a continuum, there is no reason to
designate a separate concept for individuals at the
extreme end of severity. Here we introduce a
concept that we will elaborate upon below, which is
that we believe that alexithymia, conceived
fundamentally as a deficit in naming and mentally
representing emotion, is actually a broad clinical
phenomenon that encompasses a variety of different
possible mechanisms that can generate
phenotypically similar clinical manifestations. If one
considers the analogy of hyperglycemia as a
continuum, patients can manifest the full range of
fasting blood glucose levels, but this continuum is
not inconsistent with the fact that categorically
different mechanisms involving insufficient insulin
activity, Type 1 and Type 2 diabetes, can be at fault.
Similarly, we argue below for intensified efforts to
understand the various neural/cognitive
mechanisms that lead to the phenotypic expression
of what is called alexithymia.
4. As noted above, Taylor and colleagues claim that
the covariation of TAS-20 and self-reported negative
affect is not a problem. They point out that
alexithymia involves dysregulated affect and as such
should be expected to be associated with indicators
of affective distress such as anxiety and depression.
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As we noted above, this is a valid point, but it is
problematic in the context of examining the
association between alexithymia and medical
disorders, where self-reported negative affect is
already a known predictor of adverse medical
outcome [20]. The concept of affective agnosia
specifically captures the phenomenon that affective
arousal that is persistent and undifferentiated may
not be recognized as an emotional state and thus
may not be reported as such (which at the extreme
could reduce self-reported negative affect). Thus, it
considers that arousal can still be present even
though low self-reported affect would suggest that
such physiological arousal is absent.
In addition to the findings regarding the Reading
the Mind in the Eyes Test noted above, to date
there are four other studies comparing clinical and
control groups demonstrating significant group
differences in TAS-20 scores in the predicted
direction, but these differences in TAS-20 scores
disappeared when controlling for self-reported
negative affect. By contrast, comparable significant
differences in these groups were observed with the
LEAS that did not change when controlling for
negative affect. For example, patients with essential
hypertension were compared to patients with
secondary hypertension due to other medical causes
such as renal disease; patients with essential
hypertension had higher TAS-20 and lower LEAS
scores than the comparison group; when these
differences were controlled for negative affect, the
group difference in TAS-20 scores disappeared
whereas the group difference in LEAS remained
statistically significant [48]. The very same pattern
was observed in three additional studies comparing
patients to healthy volunteers in separate clinical
contexts including skin-restricted lupus
erythematosus [49], eating disorders [50] and those
receiving treatment on a psychosomatic medicine
inpatient treatment unit [51]. These results suggest
that the LEAS is capable of detecting the influence
of an impairment in emotion conceptualization in
medical contexts, whereas the ability of the TAS-20
to do so is more uncertain and variable. Put in
terms of underlying constructs, the tendency to use
emotion concepts in thought (LEAS) may capture
something uniquely important in these medical
contexts that is not captured by self-reported beliefs
pertaining to the (conceptually related) three
TAS-20 factors.
5. We also disagree about the extent to which the
TAS-20 is a good predictor of medical outcome in
prospective studies. In the source document we
stated that “research to date has provided only very
limited evidence for an association between
alexithymia as measured by the TAS-20 and
medical outcomes.” One review [52] revealed that
“no prospective studies of TAS-20 as a predictor of
medical outcome have been published.” Taylor and
colleagues pointed out studies of the TAS-20 as a
short-term predictor of pain and physical
symptoms, one of which controlled for affective
distress. There are also numerous cross-sectional
studies using the TAS-20 in medical contexts [53],
which are of considerable value as they highlight
medical contexts where affective deficits may be
present. To our knowledge, however, there are still
no long-term prospective epidemiological studies of
TAS-20 as a predictor of systemic medical disorders
after correcting for emotional distress, despite the
relative ease with which the TAS-20 could be
included in such studies. This is significant given
that we believe that a measure of severe alexithymia
(affective agnosia) could be such a predictor, based
on the claims put forward above. Of course, this
will need to be confirmed by such prospective
studies using the LEAS as well, which to our
knowledge have not yet been attempted.
In their rebuttal, Taylor and colleagues highlighted
results of a 20-year follow-up study that began in
the late 1980s [54], in 2321 men in Finland using
the version of the TAS developed prior to TAS-20,
the TAS-26. Thus, the results do not address the
statements made above about the TAS-20. The
study in question [55] revealed that the risk of
cardiovascular death increased 1.2% for every 1-
point increase in TAS-26 scores after controlling
for a variety of variables, including depression.
While this is certainly an important finding, there
are some limitations worth considering. For
example, the prevalence of alexithymia in this
sample was 34% compared to a 17% prevalence rate
of alexithymia in Finnish men using the TAS-20
[56] – leading to potential issues regarding
generalization. It is also unclear whether the higher
prevalence of alexithymia could be related to 1) the
use of the older TAS-26 measure, 2) a possible
cohort effect of elevated alexithymia involving
trauma related to World War II in Finnish men, or
3) the ability of older age to itself account for the
high rates of alexithymia (which could be a different
generational cohort effect).
Further light has been shed on the issue in a
larger study in France that began in the 1990s [57].
In contrast to the Finnish study, no participants had
heart disease at baseline. In this study, 5586
participants (2312 men) were followed for an
average of 8.9 years. Results showed that TAS-26
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scores did not predict cardiovascular events. Thus,
the generalizability of the finding in the Finnish
study is open to question. Of course, it should be
acknowledged that many current studies using the
LEAS also have potential limitations regarding
generalizability, and a greater amount of cross-
cultural and longitudinal studies are necessary in
this field generally.
Future research on affective processing deficits in
alexithymia
Since our source article on affective agnosia [7], our own
thinking on this issue has advanced. In particular, we put
forward the “Three-Process Model” of affective processing
[58] that extends and elaborates on the concept of affective
agnosia. Specifically, we proposed that there are three inter-
related (but partially dissociable) neuro-cognitive processes
that can contribute to individual differences in emotional
awareness - affective response generation, internal state rep-
resentation (conceptualization), and cognitive control pro-
cesses that modulate conscious accessibility - and that each
can break down in multiple ways resulting in low emotional
awareness. The affective agnosia model highlighted a deficit
in conceptualization, a memory-dependent process that is
the basis for categorization, that in turn leads to deficits in
recognition. The three-process model highlights that a lack
of affective (viscero−/skeleto-motor) response generation or
overly coarse-grained affective responses could also contrib-
ute to a phenotypic lack of awareness of emotional experi-
ence. The latter was highlighted in the work of Vorst and
Bermond [59] who emphasized the need to include a deficit
in affective arousal as a possible factor contributing to alex-
ithymia. The third process, cognitive control, includes
externally-focused attention that could be associated with a
deficit in internally focused attention to emotion [41]. Defi-
cits in this third process can also involve state-dependent
constraints in the ability to hold information about emotions
in working memory (i.e., constraining explicit deliberation
and verbal reporting), which could occur as a result of high
levels of arousal (the first process) and an associated decline
in prefrontal cortex function [60]. The third process could
also include avoidance strategies such as distraction or
psychological defenses, as well as other attention-related
factors. As such, the three-process model embraces the con-
tent addressed by the different factors of the TAS-20 and
the Bermond–Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire but does so
in a way that allows for objective rather than self-report
assessments.
We recently published a detailed case report of a
woman with severe alexithymia using this framework
that suggested contributions of each of these three
factors [43]. While the LEAS can be influenced by
differences in each process, other measures may allow
them to be separated. For example, affective response
generation can be objectively measured using peripheral
physiological responses such as skin conductance or
facial EMG responses as well as self-reported valence
and arousal ratings to standard affect-eliciting stimuli
such as International Affective System Pictures [61]
(although these self-reports also depend on subsequent
representation). Conceptualization ability can be mea-
sured using scales of emotional understanding [62] and
emotion granularity [63]. Cognitive control can be
assessed using TAS-20 Factor 3 (externally oriented at-
tention), measures of cognitive suppression [64] and a
measure of defensiveness [65] consisting of the combin-
ation of the Marlowe-Crowne [66] and Bendig Short
Form of the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale [67]. These
are simply examples and other measures in each cat-
egory are certainly possible. For example, in a recent
computational modeling study, we simulated dynamics
within the three-process model (discussed further below)
and demonstrated ways in which measures of task reac-
tion times and neuroimaging measures could further dis-
tinguish different abnormal mechanisms [68].
An advantage of this approach is that these three domains
of objective assessment can be mapped onto different brain
networks. In our source paper we focused on communica-
tion between subcortical affective response generation
structures, peripheral bodily states, insula-based body state
representation structures (among other relevant regions
such as somatosensory cortex and anterior cingulate), med-
ial prefrontal/default mode network structures involved in
conceptualization (including conceptualization of valenced
bodily states), and frontal-parietal structures associated with
top-down cognitive influences. Establishing such correspon-
dences between psychological characteristics and their neu-
roanatomic substrates advances the opportunities to identify
brain mechanisms that influence bodily states. At the same
time, detailed studies of relevant psychological processes can
be undertaken corresponding to each of the three processes,
such as the role of episodic and semantic memories in
determining how individuals consciously or unconsciously
interpret/evaluate/appraise the situations they’re in, which
then affect the nature and granularity of affective responses
[69], the role of language and memory in categorization and
conceptualization [70], and the ways that attention can be
deployed or redirected to enhance or avoid emotion experi-
encing [71]. Based on the principle that autonomic regula-
tion is under hierarchical control [72], the relative
contribution of each level of deficit could influence the bod-
ily expression, pathophysiological potential and disease risk
for any given individual. As described in our source paper,
this is consistent with a specific model whereby the mental
representation deficit associated with affective agnosia in-
volves impairment or lack of engagement of the medial pre-
frontal cortex; relative inactivity in this region is plausibly
related to reductions in parasympathetic influence (as
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indexed by heart rate variability) which can in turn disinhibit
inflammatory disease-promoting processes [73]. This frame-
work could also potentially make it possible to identify indi-
viduals independent of self-report who phenotypically
manifest affective agnosia because of a deficit in one of these
processes alone or a combination of two or more.
By extension to the neurological literature, one may
hypothesize the existence of additional subtypes of
affective agnosia. As we discussed in the source docu-
ment, a distinction is drawn in neurology between
‘apperceptive’ and ‘associative’ agnosia [74]. Apperceptive
agnosia involves failure to formulate a distinct extero-
ceptive percept. The analog of this in our model would
be a failure to have a clearly defined bodily sensation or
percept mediated by the insula (and interconnected
somatosensory/proprioceptive processing cortices). To
our knowledge, research has not addressed variation in
how well-formed bodily percepts are. One way of asses-
sing this independent of language is to have people draw
the location and contours of their bodily experiences or
somatic symptoms using a cell phone-based app [75] or
other tools currently used to gather data on felt distribu-
tions of bodily sensations during emotion [76]. One can
also imagine provoking somatic sensations with drugs
such as isoproterenol [75] or exertion and comparing
the differentiation and complexity of verbal descriptions
of bodily sensations in the resting/placebo vs. activated
states. Associative agnosia is a disconnection disorder; it
involves a normal percept “stripped of meaning.” The
analog of this in our model would be a failure to connect
the affective bodily state to stored conceptual knowledge
about it. The mechanism here would involve a failure in
the functional interaction between the aforementioned
structures representing bodily percepts and the medial
prefrontal cortex (and associated default network struc-
tures) where conceptual knowledge about emotional
states may be integrated with this perceptual informa-
tion. There could also be a deficiency of stored know-
ledge about emotional states – which could be due to a
failure to acquire emotion concept knowledge during
development. Depending on its origin, this might be
loosely analogous to what neurologists call ‘semantic de-
mentia.’ It would be interesting, for example, to under-
take a study of patients with somatic symptom disorders
who appear to be overly focused on their bodily sensa-
tions. One can imagine, using this framework, that any
of these possibilities might be observed in different
cases. Could it be that a common problem in this con-
text is that patients have vivid bodily sensations, and
may have quite adequate stored conceptual knowledge
about emotions, but fail to connect the two? The treat-
ment strategies might be quite different depending upon
what was found. All of this illustrates the heuristic po-
tential of the affective agnosia concept.
The element of cognitive control in the three-process
model also raises another very important point touched
upon by Taylor and colleagues, who refer to alexithymia
as a deficit in the ability to cognitively “elaborate” on
experience. It is difficult to tell exactly what this means
in relation to emotional experience. One interpretation
is that individuals with severe alexithymia have the same
emotional experience (in terms of range, differentiation
and complexity) as do healthy individuals but they sim-
ply have a problem attending to or reporting on it – they
in some sense “fail to formulate the words” in particular
contexts despite having the conceptual resources to do
so. This could represent one possible mechanism leading
to the anomia version of alexithymia discussed above
(however, this mechanism would be attention-dependent
and could also hinder the use of emotion concept know-
ledge). A second interpretation is that the emotional
experience and conceptualization ability of individuals
with severe alexithymia is actually quite impoverished
and limited relative to that of healthy individuals. This
corresponds to the alternative view of Nemiah and
Sifneos [10] that these patients “may lack the basic
human ability to experience feelings.” Thus, in the sec-
ond interpretation their impairment in elaboration is a
consequence of deficient internal state representation.
This second interpretation is consistent with newer
constructivist views of emotion and emotional experi-
ence that hold that concepts (and the language used to
refer to them) aren’t mere markers of experience but are
constitutive of it and able to modulate it in important
ways [70, 77]. The analogy to wine-tasting illustrates this
point. Does a fine wine taste the same to a novice and
an expert? Most people would say no. The expert not
only has more words to describe the experience but actu-
ally recognizes more nuances in the experienced taste sen-
sations and flavors than the novice [78]. This distinction is
very important in the emotion domain as it corresponds
to the distinction between agnosia and anomia. Although
Taylor and colleagues, and their psychoanalytic predeces-
sors, pointed out that alexithymic individuals lacked words
and had impairments in mental representation, the key
issue is that one or both could be present in any given in-
dividual – one can have anomia with or without agnosia
or mental representation deficits. Therefore, it is import-
ant to make these distinctions so that accurate assess-
ments can be made of the specific deficits that a given
individual may have, and treatment strategy can be
adapted accordingly. Standard treatment approaches that
promote mental representation of emotion by encour-
aging patients to describe their feelings in a routine man-
ner will likely be insufficient if a severe deficit of the kind
described here is present.
As briefly mentioned above, we recently published a
computational model [68, 79] and simulated how
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variations in the three processes comprising the
three-process model can result in phenotypically simi-
lar deficits in emotional awareness due to different
mechanisms. This basic premise is consistent with
evidence that different mechanisms can lead to the
same phenotype of high scores on the TAS-20 [80].
The simulation revealed that the same low emotional
awareness phenotype could be due to seven distinct
mechanisms. In addition, we proposed that different
clinical treatment strategies could be used to address
each of these distinct mechanisms. These include: 1)
maladaptive affective response generation, treated by
a variety of methods including cognitive therapy [81],
exposure therapy [82] or acceptance and commitment
therapy [83]; 2) somatically biased expectations when
interpreting affective bodily sensations, treated by psy-
choeducation about the bodily expression of emotion
or “focusing,” which involves deriving the emotional
meaning of bodily sensations in context [84]; 3) poor
emotion concept acquisition, treated by teaching emo-
tion concepts or emotion-focused psychotherapy [85];
4) biased attention (failing to attend to either context
or bodily sensations), treated by mindfulness-based ap-
proaches [86] or cognitive-behavioral therapy [87]; 5) high
emotional volatility, treated by dialectical behavioral ther-
apy [88] or emotion regulation therapy [89]; 6) conscious
inaccessibility of emotional information, treated by over-
coming cognitive avoidance tendencies [90] or psycho-
dynamic psychotherapy (analysis of defense) [91]; and 7)
reduced reflective capacity, treated by mentalization-based
therapy [92, 93] or teaching emotion regulation strategies
[89]. Note, the therapies just mentioned are just examples.
It is not meant to be an exhaustive list, and many inter-
ventions could help with more than one mechanistic
problem. In general, however, given that assessment
methods exist to identify these mechanisms, this new per-
spective provides new opportunities for treating alexithy-
mia or low emotional awareness by targeting deficits in a
personalized way that can improve clinical outcomes in
this area. In our view, this provides the ultimate justifica-
tion for proposing the concept of affective agnosia and
other variations within the alexithymia spectrum.
These considerations illustrate that there is potential
utility in identifying different subtypes of alexithymia or
affective agnosia that manifest in specific individuals
based on objective assessment of deficits. Perhaps the
concept of alexithymia could be refined and expanded to
include the different types of emotion processing deficits
manifested across the three processes, not captured by
other well-defined syndromes, that may be present to
variable degrees and perhaps in different ways in differ-
ent psychiatric disorders. This is consistent with the
approach taken by van der Velde and colleagues [94], in
which different facets of alexithymia are thought to
confer risk for different types of psychopathology. This
same approach can be used to understand how different
aspects of alexithymia could potentially heighten risk for
various systemic medical disorders. In an intellectual
environment such as this it would seem prudent to
undertake large scale studies of the psychological, behav-
ioral, and neural mechanisms in affective processing in a
large number of healthy individuals and patients to de-
velop a potentially new taxonomy of emotion processing
deficits. This research could capitalize on the many ad-
vances that have been used in recent decades in the study
of the mechanisms and functional consequences of alex-
ithymia. These include, but are not limited to, structural
and functional neuroimaging techniques, autonomic and
other psychophysiological measures, basic cognitive func-
tions including encoding and retrieval of episodic and se-
mantic memories, priming and implicit processing,
working memory, linguistic abilities, conceptualization
and categorization skills, and executive functioning, as
well as basic bodily and affective functions including in-
teroceptive abilities, affect labeling, emotion recognition
and emotion knowledge [95, 96]. Such research would
also provide a context for exploring variations as a func-
tion of age, sex, socio-economic status, years of education
[33], cultural/ethnic background as well as the contribu-
tions of genetics, the early childhood environment (e.g.
neglect, abuse, attachment style) and their interaction to
deficits of different kinds [53].
Conclusion
Taylor and colleagues are to be commended for their
enormous contributions to the field of alexithymia re-
search [53, 97]. They have put the construct on the map
in a way that would not have been possible without their
conceptual and empirical work. In this paper we have
endeavored to build upon the global construct of alex-
ithymia to propose that it consists of a family of emotion
processing deficits that have plausible meaning and im-
portant differential implications for alexithymia treat-
ment and prevention. As such, by virtue of the advances
that have been made, and the burgeoning of neurosci-
ence knowledge and tools now available, we may be en-
tering a new era of clinically-relevant neurobiologically-
based distinctions.
In this paper we have endeavored to defend and ex-
tend the concept of affective agnosia. A key concern has
been the failure of the leading measure of alexithymia,
the TAS-20, to predict adverse medical outcomes in
long-term prospective longitudinal follow-up studies. A
major reason for this may be the fact that extreme defi-
cits in emotional experience and expression, including
affective agnosia, may be difficult to capture with self-
report measures, in contrast to performance measures
that assess ability or deficits directly. The distinction
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between agnosic and anomic subtypes of alexithymia led
us to propose the concept of an alexithymia spectrum in
which similar alexithymic or low emotional awareness
phenotypes may be due to a variety of different etiologic
mechanisms. We then reviewed the three-process model
of emotion processing and how computational model
simulations suggest that the low emotional awareness
phenotype could occur due to seven distinct mecha-
nisms, each of which has specific treatment implications.
These results suggest that the traditional difficulty in
treating alexithymia may derive in part from its hetero-
geneous nature and the need to identify the specific
nature of the deficits in individual cases. The potential
ability to improve patient care in this way based on this
perspective is the ultimate justification for the utility of
the affective agnosia concept. In addition to their appli-
cation to psychiatric and neurological disorders, we
would highlight the potentially critical importance of
this work on the neurobiology of emotion processing
deficits to the context that originally inspired the sem-
inal contributions of Sifneos and Nemiah – namely the
role of alexithymia in the development and progression
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